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Abstract 
The capability maturity model integration (CMMI) has become one of the most preferred approaches 
to software process improvement (SPI). However, the amount of discontinued or delayed CMMI-
driven SPI projects is considerable. In this paper we investigate the culture embedded in the CMMI 
and compare it with the cultures within an implementing organization in Scandinavia by utilising the 
competing values framework. We search for congruencies in culture profiles and relate the profiles to 
assessment results in different business areas of the organization. Our research reveals that in spite of 
similar culture profiles in the business areas, which are significantly different from the culture profile 
of the CMMI, there is no apparent association with the level of SPI success. Furthermore, even if 
CMMI based process descriptions are not adapted to the software organisation’s specific culture 
profile, evidence suggests that SPI success is possible. 
Keywords: Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI), competing values framework, 
organizational culture, software process improvement. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the years software process improvement (SPI) has emerged as the preferred approach to 
achieving efficient high-quality software development in complex organizations. The research and 
practicability of SPI has been expressed in many ways through e.g. SPICE (Emam et al., 1998), the 
European bootstrap model (Kuvaja et al. 1994), the capability maturity model (CMM) (Paulk et al., 
1993) and the newer capability maturity model integration (CMMI) (CMMI Product Team, 2001), all 
contributing to our current knowledge of optimal processes in software development. However, CMM 
and now CMMI have generated a certain standard as to how demanding customers expect their 
suppliers to function internally. Nonetheless, in spite of the considerable amount of money spent on 
process improvements the disappointment rate is evident (Herbsleb et al., 1997) (SEI, 2002). SPI is a 
complicated issue, and (Mathiassen et al., 2002) underline the implementation issues through several 
large case companies. Much research questions whether CMM is a sound approach and some are even 
very critical towards it; see (Hansen et al., 2004; Mathiassen et al., 2005; Nielsen and Nørbjerg, 2001; 
Aaen, 2002). 
(Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003) claim that the CMM models (SW-CMM and P-CMM) contain 
several major organizational culture contradictions between core model assumptions which may pose 
challenges to an implementing organization. Furthermore, they believe that the CMM could benefit 
from a comprehensive understanding of organizational design, culture and change, for example by 
extending the model with a framework of organizational change. However, there is very little research 
to support this. State of the art research on the topic of culture in SPI points to culture as a factor that 
influences the adoption and implementation of SPI. Successful implementation and the management 
of software processes improvement depends on the fit between the values of various subgroups and 
the values embedded in the new software development process (Dubé and Robey, 1999). Moreover, 
alignment between the values embedded in a software development process and the organizational 
culture facilitates implementation (Dubé, 1998). In fact, if the cultural assumptions embedded in an 
SPI maturity model like the SW-CMM are at odds with the assumptions underlying the organizational 
culture, the implementation may be in jeopardy (Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003). Additionally the 
application and adoption of such models, e.g. the SW-CMM, promotes certain types of organizational 
cultures implying a possible conflict between the maturity model being used and the culture of the 
organization (Boehm, 2000). The cultural assumptions embedded in models like the CMM and CMMI 
are western in origin which necessitates adaptation to the national culture context of an organization 
(Phongpaibul and Boehm, 2005). Chances of effecting change through SPI may be increased by 
building a positive work climate and promoting job satisfaction (Yamamura, 1999). Despite these 
contributions to our knowledge about culture in SPI, current research has not sufficiently dealt with 
the impact of cultural incongruity on the level of success. Among other things, existing research does 
not adequately address the question of the need for cultural congruency between software 
organizations and SPI models. In this paper we address this research question. We have studied a 
Scandinavian software organization to determine whether the success or failure of CMMI based SPI is 
attributable to organizational culture. For the purpose of the empirical investigation, we have used the 
competing values framework by (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) underlying the theoretical study by 
(Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003). 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the competing values framework and 
its measurement instrument. Section 3 outlines the research approach based on this framework. In 
section 4 we describe the case on which our argument is based, and we analyse the case data. Section 
5 contains a discussion of our findings, and section 6 concludes the argument. 
2 COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK 
The Competing Values Framework (Quinn et al., 1983) identifies four clusters of opposite types of 
organizational culture. As the name suggests these opposite sets of basic assumptions, orientations, 
and core values of organizational cultures are competing. Different indicators of organizational culture 
can be sorted along two dimensions. One dimension differentiates criteria that emphasize stability, 
order, and control from criteria that emphasize flexibility, discretion, and dynamism. The other 
dimension contrasts on the one hand internal orientation, integration, and unity with on the other hand 
external orientation, differentiation, and rivalry. Each of the four clusters or quadrants formed by these 
two dimensions represents a culture type labelled clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy respectively. 
These four culture types are theoretical constructs or archetypes, and most organizations contain 
elements of all of them (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Only when viewed through the theoretical 
framework does an organizational culture appear as a mixture of culture types. In reality an 
organizational culture is specific in nature with concrete characteristics. 
 
Figure 1. The Competing Values Framework 
Source: Adapted from (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the two-dimensional space that embraces the four culture types. The figure also 
contains keywords that are used to describe each of these culture types. For example, in a clan culture 
commitment to employees and their individual development takes center stage. Emphasis is on the 
work environment, solidarity (internal cohesion) and teamwork, and other keywords that describe this 
culture type are empowerment, involvement and loyalty. 
The widely used measurement instrument based on the competing values framework, the 
organizational culture assessment instrument (OCAI), has been developed and tested by (Cameron and 
Quinn, 1999). The OCAI uses a questionnaire to establish a culture profile based on the four culture 
types. That is, the tool assesses the relative importance of elements of the culture types in an 
organization. For example, an organization might be dominated by the clan culture type (60%), 
supported by elements of the adhocracy culture type (30%), but only marginally influenced by the 
hierarchy and market culture types (5% each). In order to avoid attaching too much importance to the 
numerical values ascribed to each of the culture types, e.g. by claiming that the organization is x % 
hierarchical, y % market, z % clan, and w % adhocracy, the percentage points should be interpreted as 
expressions of tendencies within the organization rather than facts (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). 
Using the OCAI presents two advantages to this study. First, it is a non-intrusive and inexpensive 
(measured by the time used by each respondent to answer the six questions on the questionnaire) way 
of identifying an organization’s culture profile. Second, the usefulness of the tool has been validated in 
practice. The authors cite empirical validation in numerous organizations (Cameron and Quinn, 1999), 
and the many instances of the OCAI being used by practitioners and researchers (see for example Al-
Khalifa and Aspinwall, 2001; Dastmalchian et al., 2000) lend credibility to this claim of validity. 
Thus, the tool is useful in providing an approximate picture of an organizational culture (or in this case 
subcultures) or tendencies within that culture. 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The investigation was carried out in a large Scandinavian high-tech organization, Systems Inc. (the 
name of the organization and its business units are anonymized to protect sensitive data). The basic 
research approach follows the structure of a case study as outlined by (Yin, 1994). The case study is 
part of a larger collaborative practice research effort (Mathiassen, 2002) undertaken by one of the 
authors. The collaborative practice research setting has provided access to many sources of empirical 
data and has given a larger context for our interpretation of the data. We have utilized several data 
sources and followed four steps in our data collection and analysis: 
1. Data selection and collection 
2. Algorithmic data processing 
3. Data analysis 
4. Comparative data analysis across data sources 
The fundamental idea underlying the study was to obtain an understanding of the influence on 
organizational culture by the embedded culture of the CMMI. The procedure for analyzing the CMMI 
as a text in search for elements of organizational culture was described by (Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 
2003). In our study we have extended this procedure to include several data sources:  
• The CMMI specification by the Software Engineering Institute 
• CMMI based internal (Systems Inc.) standard operating procedures known as Systems Inc. 
Management System (SMS) 
• Systems Inc. internal news: News on Systems Inc.’s intranet spanning a 3-year period 
In addition, we have depended on the OCAI and process maturity assessments performed during 
Systems Inc.’s SPI project as primary data sources. In the following the selection and collection of 
data (step 1) from these five sources are presented in greater detail along with the algorithmic data 
processing (step 2). The data analysis (step 3) and comparative data analysis across data sources (step 
4) are presented in section 4. 
3.1 The OCAI survey in two business areas 
The questionnaire developed by (Cameron and Quinn, 1999), see section 2, was translated from 
English into the national language of the organization. The questionnaire was distributed to and 
answered by employees in two different business units. The questionnaire was digitized and the 
software tool Inquisite was used to facilitate both the data collection and the data analysis. By mid 
September 2006, the questionnaire was sent to 37 respondents in department 1, Defcom, and 40 
respondents in department 2, Aeronaut, with respectively 85% and 55% of the respondents completing 
the questionnaire. Rather than selecting representative respondents the whole population of all middle 
managers, project managers, and project participants that had participated in the software process 
improvement effort were selected. Since we were interested in the effect of organizational subcultures 
on process implementation efforts, it was deemed appropriate to include only employees who had 
actually contributed to these efforts. Having collected the data, culture profiles were produced as 
described by (Cameron and Quinn, 1999), see section 2. One culture profile was generated for each of 
the two business units. 
3.2 The textual analysis of CMMI, SMS, and Systems Inc. internal news 
For the purpose of establishing culture profiles of the documents (CMMI, SMS, and Systems Inc. 
internal news) based on the competing values framework we have performed quantitative textual 
analyses in a manner similar to that of (Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003) in their study of the CMM. To 
that end we used the software tool ATLAS.ti to perform word counts and frequency analyses on all the 
documents. The descriptions of each of the four culture types of the Competing Values Framework 
were analyzed in search for words and phrases that collectively describe the culture types (Cameron 
and Quinn, 1999: 33-40). The selection of key words and phrases was an iterative process in which 
culture codes were proposed and validated through discussion. During this process some of the 
proposed culture codes were discarded while new ones surfaced. Originally some culture codes were 
too broad (e.g. risk) while others were too specific (e.g. results-orientation) to warrant a search for 
their occurrence. Afterwards, we searched for occurrences of the selected words and phrases in the 
CMMI, the SMS, and the Systems Inc. internal news using ATLAS.ti. Since some of the words and 
phrases were ambiguous and not readily operable in such a search, it was necessary to include 
synonyms and different combinations of words. Arriving at these synonyms and word combinations 
was a time-consuming process and involved establishing and discussing more than 250 culture codes. 
Three examples illustrate the need for these synonyms and word combinations. First, the concept of 
“employee development” (clan culture) is synonymous with “personal development” and we wanted 
to make sure that our search included such synonyms. Consequently, we established a list of 
synonyms for each word or phrase that was part of one of the four culture types. Second, the concept 
of “risk taking” (adhocracy culture) has not only numerous synonyms, e.g. “taking a risk” and “taking 
chances”, but may also be described as something undesirable which stands in contrast to its positive 
connotation in the adhocracy culture type. We wanted to make sure that our search only included “risk 
taking” as desirable behaviour. Therefore, we established a number of compound codes like “risk” not 
co-occurring in the same sentence with “avoid”. Third, different inflexions of the word 
“predictability” (hierarchy culture) exist. It may for example appear as “predictable”, “predict” etc., 
and we wanted to make sure that our search included such inflexions. Therefore, we used wildcards in 
our searches, i.e. predict* to encompass them all. Having searched the documents in a rigorous and 
exhaustive manner for words and phrases that describe the culture types, we performed weighed 
(taking into account an uneven number of words and phrases for each culture type) distribution 
analyses to show the prevalence (in percentages) of the four culture types in each of the documents. 
Based on these distribution analyses we established a culture profile for each of the documents similar 
to the OCAI profiles. 
3.3 The CMMI Assessments 
Software process assessments produce insight into the current state of an organization’s software 
development practices, help prioritize improvement initiatives, and are used to periodically evaluate 
and re-plan ongoing SPI initiatives (Humphrey 1990; McFeeley 1996; CMMI Product Team 2001). 
During its SPI project Systems Inc. relied on the Electronic Based Assessment Tool (EBAT) for 
continuous process maturity assessments (Müller et al., 2007). The tool allows for measurements of a 
project’s degree of CMMI level 2 compliance, and as such EBAT was an integral part of the 
organization’s measurement strategy. The tool was used repeatedly for determining whether systems 
development practices at the project level were compliant with both required and expected CMMI 
model components. During the SPI implementation EBAT was used on more than 30 new and 
ongoing projects. Assessments were performed on average every 3 to 4 months to evaluate the 
progress of putting new processes into practice. In keeping with (Müller et al., 2007) the operational 
goal of the SPI project was to reach 75% compliance. 
For the purpose of this paper we have used EBAT assessments from three consecutive measurement 
milestones during the SPI implementation in both Aeronaut and Defcom. Assessments at milestone 1, 
2 and 3 were carried out in December/November 2005, March 2006 and May/June 2006 respectively. 
At each milestone for each business unit an average score was calculated for the degree of CMMI 
compliance for each process area at level 2. Also, a score for the overall level of compliance across 
process areas was calculated for each business unit. Not all process areas were included in every 
assessment. The selection of process areas to be assessed depended on the implementation plans for 
each business unit. Only process areas that the business unit was implementing at that time were 
included in the assessment for that milestone. 
4 CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
Systems Inc. is a Scandinavian high-tech organization that develops software solutions, systems and 
products for civilian and military applications used in extreme environments. The fact that human 
lives and valuable material assets are at stake, makes Systems Inc.’s development activities highly 
critical and knowledge intensive. Therefore, Systems Inc. is committed to improving its process 
maturity and systems development capabilities in part through the use of CMMI. The reason for using 
CMMI has to do with the fact that Systems Inc. is contracting with customers who require their 
suppliers to be operating at CMMI level 3. Systems Inc. is comprised of autonomous business units 
two of which are the focus of this paper. One of the business units, Aeronaut, is an organization of 143 
people and a global provider of advanced aerospace technology. The other business unit, Defcom, is 
an organization of 155 people and a global provider of advanced defense technology. 
4.1 Overview 
The results from the OCAI analysis of the two business units and the textual analysis of the three 
documents (CMMI, SMS, and Systems Inc. internal news) are shown in Table 1. 
 
Adhocracy Clan Hierarchy Market 
CMMI, v1.1 7% 25% 36% 32% 
CMMI, v1.1, ML2 8% 21% 31% 40% 
Systems Inc. internal news 24% 28% 21% 27% 
Systems Inc. Management 
System 11% 23% 30% 36% 
Aeronaut 18% 23% 31% 28% 
Defcom 19% 25% 33% 23% 
Table 1. Culture profiles 
 
Table 1 shows the cultural profiles for CMMI, CMMI level 2, Systems Inc. internal news, SMS, 
Aeronaut, and Defcom. It is not surprising that the textual analysis of CMMI reveals a high tendency 
towards the hierarchy culture (36%) and hardly any tendency towards the adhocracy culture (7%). 
This is consistent with both the CMMI management ideal (Aaen, 2003) and previous analyses of 
CMM-SW in (Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003). Looking at CMMI level 2 in isolation, we see a higher 
leaning towards the market culture (40%), while the adhocracy culture is nearly identical (8%). Table 
1 also shows the results of the textual analysis of the SMS which is dominated by the market culture 
(36%) and the hierarchy culture (30%). The dominant culture type of Systems Inc. internal news is 
less obvious, although the clan and market culture types are in the lead (28% and 27% respectively). 
Both Aeronaut and Defcom show a tendency towards the hierarchy culture (31% and 33% 
respectively), and the overall profiles for these two business units are very similar. No difference 
above five percentage points exists. 
Looking at Aeronaut, the dominance of the hierarchy culture (31%) indicates that stability, efficiency, 
and structure take center stage. Almost as dominant is the market culture (28%) that emphasizes 
environment, competitiveness, and market share. Both culture types stress stability, order, and control 
(see Figure 1). Defcom, on the other hand, is dominated by the hierarchy and clan culture types which 
underscore the importance of internal orientation, integration, and unity. 
To be able to identify patterns of interest in relation to the differences in culture profiles as they appear 
in Table 1, Table 2 has been created. It shows the level of incongruity between selected culture 
profiles. 
 
Adhocracy Clan Hierarchy Market 
Systems Inc. Management 
System vs. CMMI ML2     
Percentage difference 37,5% 9,5% -3,2% -10,0% 
Percentage points difference 3 2 -1 -4 
Systems Inc. internal news 
vs. Systems Inc. Management 
System     
Percentage difference 118,2% 21,7% -30,0% -25,0% 
Percentage points difference 13 5 -9 -9 
Aeronaut vs. Systems Inc. 
Management System      
Percentage difference 63,6% 0,0% 3,3% -22,2% 
Percentage points difference 7 0 1 -8 
Defcom vs. Systems Inc. 
Management System     
Percentage difference 72,7% 8,7% 10,0% -36,1% 
Percentage points difference 8 2 3 -13 
Defcom vs. Aeronaut     
Percentage difference 5,6% 8,7% 6,5% -17,9% 
Percentage points difference 1 2 2 -5 
Table 2. Culture profile differences in percentages and percentage points 
 
The level of incongruity is presented in Table 2 as both a percentage difference and a percentage point 
difference between culture profiles. The culture profiles are established based on accepted 
measurement techniques, but the resulting numbers are approximations. They are stochastic variables 
and should be viewed with reservation. Consequently, we define congruence between two culture 
profiles using a broad criterion leaving ample room for deviations on the variables: two culture 
profiles are congruent if and only if the percentage point difference for each of the four culture types 
is less than 5 and at the same time their primary and secondary culture types are the same. Based on 
this definition we therefore conclude that the SMS is congruent with CMMI level 2 and that all the 
other culture profiles compared in Table 2 are incongruent. The congruence between SMS and CMMI 
level 2 was expected, since the SMS was developed as an instantiation of CMMI level 2, and because 
considerable effort was put into ensuring compliance of the SMS with the process guidelines provided 
at CMMI level 2. 
4.2 Comparison Graphs 
Based on the numbers in Table 1 and 2 we are now able to graphically create culture profiles and 
compare the results. We will only compare incongruent culture profiles. Additionally, since the SMS 
and CMMI level 2 are congruent, we will only compare the business units’ culture profiles with that of 
the SMS. 
 
Figure 2. Organizational Cultures vs. SMS Documents 
 
Figure 2 shows on the left hand side a comparison of the SMS and Aeronaut profiles, and on the right 
hand side a comparison of the SMS and Defcom profiles. The primary culture type of the SMS is the 
market culture, and in comparison to the Aeronaut and Defcom profiles this is where the largest 
difference exists (8 and 13 percentage points). However, whereas the two business units score lower 
on market culture, the adhocracy culture type is more pronounced for both Aeronaut and Defcom 
compared to the SMS (7 and 8 percentage points). Other differences are negligible. 
The culture profiles of the two business units are much alike as seen in Figure 3, but they are 
incongruent according to our definition. 
 
Figure 3. Organizational Culture Profile of Defcom vs. Aeronaut 
 
Figure 3 reveals small yet significant differences. The primary culture type of both Aeronaut and 
Defcom is the hierarchy culture (31% and 33% respectively). The market culture accounts for the 
largest difference (5 percentage points) between the two business units. 
The culture profiles of the SMS and the Systems Inc. internal news are also incongruent. An in-depth 
analysis of this incongruity and the contents of the Systems Inc. internal news has revealed that very 
few news clips deal with the SPI project. The Systems Inc. internal news are the responsibility of the 
communications department, and their content mediation (selection, creation, and editing of content) 
seemingly promotes a different culture profile than those of the business units. It is, however, outside 
the scope of this study to investigate the reason for this incongruity. 
4.3 Assessment results 
The process maturity and degree of CMMI level 2 compliance of the two business units was assessed 
three times during the SPI implementation. The assessment results for each of the three milestones are 
documented in Table 3. The number of projects that participated in and were assessed during the SPI 
implementation changed over time reflecting management’s prioritization of the SPI project. Although 
Aeronaut had as many as eight projects participating in the project at one time, only two projects 
remained at the end. Defcom started out with five participating projects, but ended up with six 
projects. 
 
Assessment Milestones Business 
Unit Milestone 1(Dec/Nov 2005) Milestone 2 (Mar 2006) Milestone 3 (Jun/May2006) 
Aeronaut  
• --- 
• PP: 
• PMC: 
• --- 
• --- 
• --- 
• CM: 
 
Average:  
 
•
• 71% 
• 62% 
•
•
•
• 75% 
 
• 69,3% 
 
• REQM: 
• PP: 
• PMC: 
• SAM: 
• MA: 
• PPQA: 
• CM: 
 
Average:  
• 57% 
• 68% 
• 54% 
• 62% 
• 46% 
• 53% 
• 68% 
 
• 58,3% 
 
• REQM: 
• PP: 
• PMC: 
• SAM: 
• --- 
• PPQA: 
• CM: 
 
Average:  
 
• 66% 
• 74% 
• 69% 
• 69% 
•
• 58% 
• 68% 
 
• 67,3% 
Defcom  
• --- 
• PP: 
• PMC: 
• --- 
• --- 
• --- 
• --- 
 
Average:  
 
•
• 74% 
• 64% 
•
•
•
•
• 69,0% 
• REQM: 
• PP: 
• PMC: 
• SAM: 
• MA: 
• PPQA: 
• CM: 
 
Average:  
 
• 71% 
• 76% 
• 66% 
• 68% 
• 35% 
• 68% 
• 75% 
 
• 65,6% 
• REQM: 
• PP: 
• PMC: 
• SAM: 
• --- 
• PPQA: 
• CM: 
 
Average:  
 
• 76% 
• 78% 
• 76% 
• 77% 
•
• 75% 
• 81% 
 
• 77,2% 
Table 3. Assessment Results for Aeronaut and Defcom 
 
The abbreviations in the table represent the seven process areas in CMMI level 2: Requirements 
Management (REQM), Project Planning (PP), Project Monitoring and Control (PMC), Supplier 
Agreement Management (SAM), Measurements and Analysis (MA), Process and Product Quality 
Assurance (PPQA), and Configuration Management (CM). 
The average scores for the two business unit show that the degree of CMMI level 2 compliance and 
the rate of implementation is persistently higher in Defcom than in Aeronaut (except for milestone 1). 
At the third milestone Defcom was above the threshold of 75% in all process areas whereas none of 
Aeronaut’ process areas were compliant. The degree of CMMI compliance is an indicator of speed and 
status of the SPI implementation at different points in time. Based on the goal of 75% compliance we 
are able to conclude that Defcom was successful in achieving this goal while Aeronaut was not. 
5 DISCUSSION 
It is possible to establish culture profiles of the CMMI and the subset of the model describing CMMI 
level 2. Our analysis supports previous studies showing the dominance of the hierarchical and market 
culture types (Hansen et al., 2004; Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003). Previous studies sceptical of the 
underlying management ideals of the CMMI and its predecessor the SW-CMM arrive at similar 
conclusions (Bach, 1994; Bach, 1995; Bollinger and McGowan, 1991; Brodman and Johnson, 2000). 
It is of interest to both managers and researchers of systems development organizations whether 
congruence between the culture profiles of the CMMI and the organization doing SPI is a prerequisite 
for successfully reaching maturity level 2 or higher. Although previous studies are based on the 
implicit assumption that congruence is necessary, our findings do not support such a conclusion. The 
argument is presented below. 
SPI at Systems Inc. focused on updating and ensuring adherence to internal process descriptions and 
standard operating procedures (the SMS). Our analysis of the SMS shows it to be congruent with 
CMMI level 2 which comes as no surprise since it was updated during the SPI project to ensure 
compliance with the CMMI. The updates were spurred by desire for a future evaluation of the maturity 
of the organization by means of a formal appraisal. The congruence between the SMS and CMMI 
culture profiles suggests that the updating was successful, i.e. the CMMI requirements were 
interpreted and incorporated into the internal process descriptions and standard operating procedures 
of the SMS. 
However, whereas the CMMI and SMS culture profiles are congruent, the SMS culture profile is 
incongruent with the culture profiles of both Aeronaut and Defcom. From a theoretical perspective 
organizational cultures are change resistant, cannot be redesigned, nor can they be deliberately chosen 
and implemented (Schein, 1985). Consequently, just because Systems Inc. decided to comply with the 
CMMI, there is little if any reason to expect changes to the organizational subcultures underlying the 
systems development practices of the organization. In fact, our findings reveal that the implementation 
of the updated SMS has not brought the organizational subcultures of the two business units into 
alignment with the culture profiles of the SMS. 
Although it may seem reasonable to attribute the lack of congruence between culture profiles to 
incomplete implementation of CMMI based processes, our findings do not support such a conclusion. 
To the contrary, internal CMMI assessments showed Defcom to be compliant with CMMI level 2 at 
milestone 3 (77%). They improved the degree of compliance by 8 percentage points in the course of 
the implementation. Hence, systems development practices in Defcom were improved and determined 
to be compliant with the CMMI level 2 requirements, but at the same time the culture profile of the 
organization was incongruent with that of the CMMI. Defcom was successful in improving 
organizational maturity despite the incongruity between culture profiles. The finding is therefore that 
the cultural incongruity has not prevented Defcom from changing existing systems development 
practices. 
This finding questions the generality of previous research findings that emphasize the need for cultural 
congruence. According to the literature it is important for managers to consider the fit between values 
embedded in new processes and the specific organizational culture in which they are to be 
implemented and further to appreciate the values underpinning maturity models and models for 
software development (Dubé, 1998; Dubé and Robey, 1999; Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003). 
Although our findings do not lead us to reject the importance of culture, we find it interesting whether 
this proposition holds in all cases, but at the same time we should be cautious with drawing too far-
reaching conclusions from our case. There are several possible reasons why we can observe this 
incongruence in the Systems Inc case. First, the data collection may be too limited in which case more 
data should be collected in further studies. Second, the OCAI measurement tool may be flawed, but 
that is unlikely as it has been tested in a large number of studies and its reliability and validity has 
been studied several times as reported in (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). The OCAI is reliable which 
means our measurements of the two departments are consistent. The validity is high, i.e., which 
phenomena are supposed to be measured are actually measured. Third, the textual analysis may be 
flawed as a measurement instrument. The instrument is reliable in the sense it produces the same 
results every time it process the same text. We have insufficient data to conclude that it also valid in a 
statistical sense. Fourth, there can be specific conditions not measured by the OCAI which can explain 
the successful CMMI implementation. We have indications of this from our interactions with the 
department, but we have less reliable data on this. All this leads us to conclude that it is an interesting 
finding that should lead to further studies, because the foundation for a strong conclusion is too weak 
Turning out attention to the differences in culture profiles between the two business units, the question 
remains whether they account for the differences in SPI outcome. The answer is no. The differences in 
culture profiles point in two directions. First, the hierarchy culture type is the most dominant part of 
the profiles of both Defcom and Aeronaut. The differences between the two culture profiles are small, 
i.e. 5 percentage points at most (the market culture type). Second, although the hierarchy culture type 
dominates both the overall CMMI culture profile and the culture profiles of the two business units, the 
culture profile of CMMI level 2 (the goal of SPI at Systems Inc.) is dominated by the market culture 
type. In fact, Defcom – as the more successful of the two business units in terms of SPI – scores lower 
on this dimension than Aeronaut. Therefore, it is not possible to establish a link between SPI success 
and the differences in culture profiles between the two business units. This conclusion raises the 
question whether the OCAI is useful as a method for identifying subculture differences within the 
same organization which (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 139) claim it is. According to our analysis, the 
two business units are almost culturally congruent, yet our observations at the organization indicate 
that differences exist, but we cannot explain these differences with the data at hand.  
Our findings point in the opposite direction of the literature referenced in the introduction. First, 
(Phongpaibul and Boehm, 2005) emphasize that the assumptions underlying a SPI model must be 
adapted to fit the characteristics of national cultures. In a similar vein, (Boehm, 2000) argues that 
conflicts between maturity models and organizational cultures are probable. Examples of such 
conflicts are described in (Mathiassen et al., 2002). However, our findings question the necessity of 
bridging the gap between national cultures and the embedded cultures of SPI models in order to ensure 
success in SPI. Second, (Dubé and Robey, 1999) conclude that there has to be a fit between a 
subgroups’ values and the values embedded in their software development process. Further, (Dubé, 
1998) stresses the importance of establishing an alignment between values in the software 
development process and the underlying organizational culture. Our study cannot confirm these 
conclusions. The CMMI is North American in origin and Systems Inc. is a high-tech organization with 
roots in the national culture in a Scandinavian country, and at the level of organizational culture our 
study reveals differences in culture profiles. Despite these differences, CMMI assessments show one 
of the business units to be successful in implementing systems development processes based on a 
culture profile different from that of the organization. This is not to say that there will be no conflicts 
and struggles during SPI implementation. It is simply to say that cultural incongruity and SPI success 
seems to happen simultaneously. Third, (Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003) claim that the SW-CMM 
contains internal contradictions in terms of organizational culture which must be resolved to 
effectively improve software processes. Based on their identification of contradictions within the SW-
CMM (Ngwenyama and Nielsen, 2003) conclude that management of CMM based software process 
improvement is fraught with difficulties. Our study does not challenge this claim. It simply shows that 
it is not possible to attribute these difficulties to incongruity between organizational cultures and the 
culture embedded in SPI models alone. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have investigated the culture embedded in the CMMI and compared it with the 
subcultures of an implementing organization. For this purpose we have used the competing values 
framework. We have searched for similarities and differences between culture profiles and compared 
the profiles to SPI implementation outcomes in two business units within the organization. Culture 
profiles have been established through different techniques. Culture profiles of the two business units 
have been established by means of the OCAI developed by (Cameron and Quinn, 1999), and a culture 
profile of the CMMI has been established by means of textual analysis developed by (Ngwenyama and 
Nielsen, 2003). The outcome of SPI implementation has been evaluated by means of CMMI 
assessments. Having identified incongruities between culture profiles, we have clarified the 
implications for research and practice. Based on our analysis we have found that cultural incongruity 
does not necessarily lead to implementation failure. On the contrary, we have pointed to the possibility 
of improving systems development practices despite such incongruities. In fact, we have suggested 
that SPI is possible while maintaining the existing organizational culture. 
This study is a first of its kind involving the same framework both in a questionnaire (the OCAI) and 
an automatic textual analysis – and for software process cultures. While the OCAI have been applied 
in many studies it is fair to conclude that the instrument for textual analysis has to be improved further 
to increase its validity. In our study we have used the 5 %-criterion for congruence as an 
operationalization of our reading of the culture profiles and in further studies it should be investigated 
how congruence can be measured in a more statistically sound way. 
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